Rice v. Rehner by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Supreme Court Case Files Powell Papers
10-1982
Rice v. Rehner
Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Powell Papers at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rice v. Rehner. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 101. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee
University School of Law, Virginia.
T 
~~~ 




October 29, 1982 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 3 
No. 82-401 





CA9 (en banc) 1 
Timely 
1 (Browning, Choy, Wallace, Kennedy, Tang, Farris, Pregerson, 
Poole, Canby, Reinhardt: Goodwin, dissenting) The case was 
consolidated below with two other cases arising in Washington. 
Because those cases were remanded on another issue, the State of 
Washington has not filed a petn, although it did submit an amicus 
brief in support of California's petn. 
- ... -
1. SUMMARY: was CA9 correct in holding that n~Lther 18 
u.s.c. S1161 nor the 21st Amendment make state laws, which 
require liquor retailers to be licensed, applicable to Indian 
-~ 
reservations? _ ___, 
2. FACTS & DECISION BELOW: Resp, a member of the Pala Band 
-------, 
of Mission Indians, is a federally licensed Indian trader who 
operates a general store on the~ala reservation in California. --------- _ .... -
She sought exemption from a California law requiring a state 
license for the retail sale of distilled spirits for off-premises 
consumption. Petr, the California Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage 
- ~L.&-Lu,.._~ 
Control, rejected the request, ap~ently on the ground that 
I{ 
state law did not permit any exemptions, and seems to have told 
resp that she could not sell liquor without a license. Resp 
brought an action in federal DC seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief, principally in the form of an order that she 
did not need a license in order to sell liquor. The DC dismissed 
for failure to state a claim, apparently agreeing that California 
law did not provide for exemptions, and that this law applied to 
resp. 
CA9, sitting en bane, reversed. It began from the premise 
that unless federal law gave the state power to require a 
license, state law was irrelevant. The court thought its 
decision involved only 18 u.s.c. Sl161, which provides, 
[Federal statutes, e.g., 18 u.s.c. Sll54, creating criminal 
~ 
liability for selling liquor in Indian country] shall not apply 
within any area that js not Indian coun~ry, nor to any ac~or 
transaction ~thin any area of Indian country provided such act 
or transaction is in conformity both with the laws of the State 
in which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance 
''--
- ... -
duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of 
the Indian country •••• 
Petr argued that §1161 explicitly required compliance with both 
state law and Indian ordinances: since state law requires 
licensing, those selling liquor in Indian country violate federal 
law if they sell without a license. Petr apparently did not 
think that the case involved the question whether it could 
enforce its liquor licensing laws within Indian country, and did 
not argue this point. 




Indian country. It concluded that on this question the statute -~~ 
-~ 
in the case was whether a state could enforce its laws within 
was ambiguous, and then resolved the ambiguity in accordance with ~ 
a canon of statutory construction favoring Indians, citing 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian tribe, 435 u.s. 191, 208 n.l7 
 
C L,t. ~ f j 
(1978) , and a rule that "State laws generally are not applicable 
to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress 
has expressly provided that State laws shall apply." Bryan v. 
Itasca County, 426 u.s. 373, 392 (1976). 
TheCA began by drawing a
1
distinction; which it returned to 
It ,.. "" 
throughout the opinion, between licensing ana-aistribution laws 
of the State and what it termed "substantive laws." (The CA -
offered virtually no explanation of what "substantive laws" 
include, why this distinction follows from the statute or how 
"substantive laws" differ from licensing and distribution laws, 
see note 4 infra.). 
- 4 -
The CA first examined the language of §1161, and said that 
if "laws of the State" included licensing laws, the statute would 
create intolerable conflicts between state and tribal licensing 
regulations, particularly in states that maintained a monopoly 
over-- the sale of bottled liquor. Congress therefore could never 
have intended the phrase to include licensing. 
The court also reasoned that, since the phrase "having 
jurisdiction over such area of the Indian country" modified only 
the phrase "ordinance duly adopted by the tribe" and not "laws of 
the State", Congress must not have intended to give states 
"jurisdiction" over liquor licensing. This meant "the state [was 
to] function[] only as the source of law to be applied by the 
tribal government." Petn App. at 15. 
CA9 also looked at other~lated statutes and relevant 
legislative history. Relying on the Termination Acts, which 
divested the federal government of many powers regarding some 
Indian tribes and transferred such powers to the states, the 
court reasoned that when Congress means to give the states 
jurisdiction to regulate an area it used the word 
"jurisdiction."2 The court concluded that because §1161 does 
not explicitly provide that the states shall have jurisdiction to 
regulate licensing and distribution Congress must be assumed not 
2The authority cited by the CA was the language of 25 u.s.c. 
§726 (1976), providing that "statutes of the United States 
which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall no 
longer be applicable ••• and the laws of the several states shall 
apply to the tribe and its members 1n the same manner as they 
apply to other citizens or person within their jurisdiction." 
f 
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to have intended this result. It also relied on the fact that 
the legislative history nowhere discussed liquor licensing and 
distribution laws. 
Next, the CA turned to Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 u.s. 373 
(197~), which interpreted a federal statute [Public Law 280 
containing 18 u.s.c. §1162 and 28 u.s.c. S1360(a)] 3 conferring 
civil and criminal jurisdiction on the states, as not also 
conferring power to tax. Bryan was read as creating a rule 
favoring the denial to the states of general civil regulatory 
powers in Indian country. In addition, the CA noted that CAlO 
had interpreted S1161 as not giving the states regulatory 
authority over liquor transactions. United States v. New Mexico, 
590 F.2d 323 (CAlO 1978), cert. denied, 444 u.s. 832 (1979). 
Finally, theCA rejected petr's reliance on the 21st 
Amendment ("The transportation or importation into any State, 
3Public Law 280 contains two sections relevant here. 28 u.s.c. 
S1360(a) provides: 
Each of the States ••• listed in the following table shall have 
jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to 
which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian 
country listed ••• to the same extent that such State ••• has 
jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil 
laws of such State ••• that are of general application to private 
persons or private property shall have the same force and effect 
within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the 
State •••• 
18 u.s.c. S1162 provides: 
Each of the States ••• listed in the following table shall have 
jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the 
areas of Indian country listed ••• to the same extent that such 
State ••• has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere 
within the State ••• and the criminal laws of such State ••• 
shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country 
as they have elsewhere within the State •••• 
(~ 
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Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use 
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws 
thereos, is hereby prohibited."). The court relied on United 
States v. State Tax Commission of Mississippi, 421 u.s. 599, 613-
14 (~975) (21st Amendment is inapplicable to military base over 
which both US and state have jurisdiction), for the proposition 
that in an area subject to both state and federal jurisdiction, 
the 21st Amendment is inapplicable. 
In its holding the CA said that resp need not obtain a state 
liquor license, because Sll61 preempts state licensing and 
distribution jurisdiction over tribal liquor sales in Indian 
country. The court refused to decide two questions, raised in 
the cases consolidated below with this case, relating to the 
state's power to impose a sales tax on sales to non-Indians and 
its power to impose record-keeping requirements on liquor sellers 
in Indian country. It remanded to the District Court for 
consideration in light of Washington v. Confederated Tribes of 
the Colville Reservation, 447 u.s. 134 (1980). 
A ~e dissenting vote was cast by Judge Goodwin. He wrote 
------------that until 1953 Indian country had been "dry" under federal law; 
Section 1161 was intended to lift this prohibition -- provided 
that the newly legalized transactions were consistent with state 
law. Under the majority decision, Indians become super citizens: 
they may avoid paying monopoly prices in Wahington (which include 




3. CONTENTIONS: Petr advances very few legal arguments. 
California has been granted, under Public Law 280, 18 u.s.c. 
Sll62(a) and 28 u.s.c. S1360(a), see note 3 supra, civil and 
criminal jurisdiction overs affairs occurring within Indian 
reseEvations. Under the court's decision, California may do 
nothing to remedy traditional problems associated with the sale 
and distribution of liquor~ at most it may enact "substantive 
state standards" which the CA never defines -- but it cannot 
enforce these standards. Moreover, nothing in theCA's opinion 
limits the holding to sales to non-Indians, even assuming, that 
such a restriction could be enforced, which it could not because 
of the interspersion of Indian and state lands in many areas of 
California. 
Petr also relies on the fact that traditional principles of 
statutory construction favoring Indians, did not involve cases 
where the 21st Amendment was implicated. This Court should 
decide how the Amendment affects these principles. 
The State of Washington filed an amicus brief in support of 
the petn. It notes that Washington -- unlike California -- is 
one of 18 states that allows sale of liquor by the bottle only 
through state owned and operated stores. The State interprets 
S1161 as imposing dual requirements on liquor retailers: whatever 
standards both the State and tribe think are necessary to protect 
the public must be met. If the two sets of requirements are 
mutually inconsistent -- the State requires that liquor be 
purchased only from the State and the tribe also requires 
( 
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purchases only from it -- then §1161 cannot be satisfied, and the 
sale of liquor in Indian country becomes a crime under §1154. 
The State also argues that the CA's continued discussion of 
"jurisdiction" is irrelevant. It admits that §1161 has nothing 
to do with a state's jurisdiction to enforce its laws on the 
reservations. Rather, the section only determines when an act 
becomes a federal criminal violation -- that the federal 
government has jurisdiction to prosecute. The question whether 
the states may enforce their liquor laws on the reservations is a 
complex question determined by a number of factors such as the 
effect of Public Law 280 and cases like Bryan v. Itasca County, 
supra: Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, supra: u.s. v. Wheeler, 435 
u.s. 313 (1978). The states, however, may enforce their laws 
through off-reservation action. 
Resp argues first that California has acquiesced in CA9's 
decision by passing a law allowing liquor wholesalers to sell to 
non-state-licensed retail liquor stores in Indian country. 
Further, there is no conflict: CA9 and CAlO are the only courts 
to have passed on the preemptive effect of §1161, and they agree. 
None of the practical problems warned of by petr have come to 
pass, and this Court should wait until they do before acting. 
The only real result of the decision below is that liquor 
retailers will pay the tribe their fee, rather than the State. 
Finally, resp argues that petr did not raise its 
constitutional claim below, and that, even if it did, that claim 
is frivolous. (Resp concedes that Washington, rather than petr, 
( ~ did raise the issue below.) The 21st Amendment is not applicable 
(."'---
- -;, - c:U ~~..it-Uf 
to the power of states to deal with liquor issues outside their ~ ~ 
jurisdictions, United States v. Mississippi Tax Commission, 421 
U.S. 599, 613-14 (1975)1 Collins v. Yosemite Park & C~~ 
: ~r~~E·, ~ 0 U.S. 518, 538 (1938). In Collins this Court held 
that when the US has exclusive jurisdiction as in a fedral 
park -- the 21st Amendment is inapplicable, and in Mississippi 
Tax Commission, this rule of inapplicability was extended to 
areas where state and federal jurisdiction is concurrent. Prior 
to passage of §1161 and Public Law 280, federal jurisdiction over 
Indian reservations was exclusive: the constitutional question 
here is therefore dependent on the statutory issue, namely, did 
the federal government give the states liquor licensing 
jurisdiction? If not, as the CA held, then the 21st Amendment 
gives the states no added power. 
4. DISCUSSION: OWing to its procedural history, 
described below, this ~se is very confusing. The~whose 
opinion is not in the papers, apparently held that §1161 required 
resp to operate with a state license, and that her complaint 
seeking declaratory judgment that she did not need a state liquor 
license failed to state a claim.~reversed because of its 
reading of §1161. It held that "so long as [resp] complies with 
the certified tribal ordinance authorized by 18 u.s.c. §1161, she 
need not obtain a California license to sell liquor in Indian 
elte:r5 
i~s raised by §1161. Th~~~ t is~is whether it is a ~
federal crime, under 18 u.s.c. §1154 (forbidding sale of liquor  
country." This holding disposes of two completely separate 
in Indian country) and Sl161 (creating exemptions to that 
f-w-o 
prohibition), to operate a liquor store on a reservation without 
a state-required license. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 u.s. 
544 (1975). CA9's holding, quoted above, necessarily disposes of 
this issue: if it is a federal crime then it is not correct that 
---resp _"need not obtain a California liquor license." The~nd 
~ss~disposed of by the CA's holding · is ~heth~r federal law 
gives a st~t~ jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce liquor 
licensing statutes on Indian reservations. 
'-
The CA's decision seems to have answered both these questions 
in the negative, since it polds that Sll61 does not require resp 
""--
to get a liquor license. Yet, the first question was not almost 
--~ 
certainly not ripe for decision since there is no hint in the 
~1-q 
~ 
papers that the US ever intended to prosecute resp. 
~ 
In addition, 
there is no indication that the US was represented below, which ~ 
seems odd given CA9's interpretation of §1161 and the fact 
tha~the constitutionality of a federal statute was challenged. 
As to the correctness of the CA's resolution of this 
firs?4uestion, the language of Sll61 -- making federal criminal 
penalties for ~elling ~~~]inapplicable if "such act or 
transaction is in conformity both with the laws of the State in 
which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly 
adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of the 
Indian country" -- seems clear on its face. Persons selling 
liquor violate federal law, unless they obey 
~ 
state liquor laws. It seems indisputable -- and everyone seems 
t~ some sort of state liquor law must apply to ~ 
Indian country: otherwise, Sll61 has no meaning. The CA relied ~A~jj~; 
~
~ 
~UAI~ M.t ~ ,__,fa..ti .i.,d<.- ~ 
C-ltCf~ 
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throughout its opinion on a distinction between licensing 
./\. - ---. 
requirements and "substantive law," which is neither suggested by 
the language of the statute nor the legislative history, Petn 
App. at 20, or explained by the court. 4 This distinction is 
cen~l ·~-~i~e, however, since 
without it the court would be left holding that no state law 
applies. As noted above, this is untenable. 
It is difficult, however, to see a principled basis for 
drawing the distinction created by the CA. Even ignoring the 
lack of statutory authority, or legislative history, it is 
unclear why hours of operation are different from licensing 
requirements, but the CA finds the former applicable and the 
latter inapplicable, see note 4 supra. As washington points out, 
there is nothing particularly unusual about requiring the 
4The only hint that CA9 gives of what "substantive law" is, 
comes in a characterization of petr's theory of the case which 
includes the phrase "substantive standards such as hours of 
operation and legal age for consumption." The term might also 
include things like labelling requirements and adulteration laws, 
but this is speculation. 
A possible explanation for the source of the distinction 
lies in Tulalip Ordinance No. 43, §12, dealing with sales of 
liquor on the Tulalip reservation. This reservation was involved 
in one of the cases consolidated with the present case below: 
that case was remanded on other issues, and is not before the 
Court. The Tulalip ordinance says that "the substantive laws of 
the State of Washington" apply within the reservation. Petn App. 
at 39 n.4. If no state law applies to Indian country by virtue 
of §1161, then this ordinance would incorporate state law to 
serve as tribal law. But, even if this is correct, it is 
irrelevant to our case, which deals with a different reservation. 
The CA did not quote the Pala reservation ordinance, but 
described it as providing "that such sales were in conformity 
with the laws of California." Petn App at 2. Nobody seems to 
have argued that the ordinance -- which presumably binds resp 
incorporates all state law, including licensing requirements. 
-~-..... ~--
licensing requirements of two entities to be satisfied. The CA 
seems to have rested on the fact that some states -- like 
Washington -- have liquor monopolies. This would require actual 
state operation of storeswithin Indian country, which conceivably 
migh~ be sufficient basis for treating state-owned and operated 
stores differently under §1161, despite the absence of any 
express language to this effect. However, the petn deals only 
with California, which is not a monopoly state, so this argument 
does not appear to help resp. In short, I am unpersuaded by the 
licensing/substantive law distinction and without this CA9's 
opinion, as it relates to the existence of a federal crime, seems 
fatally flawed. 
In addition, it is not clear that ordinary principles of 
statutory construction favoring Indian self-government apply in 
full force here. These canons are considerably diluted when "the 
application of state laws to tribal Indians who have left or 
never inhabited federally established reservations, or Indians 
'who do not possess the usual accoutrements of tribal self-
government'" Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 u.s. at 376 n.2. The 
present situation, where Indians have never been permitted even 
to purchase liquor, much less to regulate its distribution, seems 
analogous. 
In summary, there are substantial arguments that CA9's --resolution of the first issue described above was wrong. 
additiion, it is unclear why CA9 decided this question. There is 
no indication in the papers that the US ever considered 
prosecution, and the dispute between petr and resp could have 
- 13 -
been resolved solely on the basis of the second question by 
holding that the state could not enforce its licensing laws on 
the reservation. The most likely explanation is that the CA's 
holding was merely worded too broadly, and that the court did not 
intend to dispose of a question not before it. 
Th~ond que~ apparently decided by CA9 is whe~her 
I l \' 
§1161, together with other statutes, grants states power to - , 
prescribe and enforce liquor licensing laws in Indian country. 
These appear to be considerably more difficult issues than the 
question of what constitutes a federal crime under §1161. CA9's 
argument that §1161 alone does not grant such prescription and 
enforcement authority is persuasive, particularly if the 
traditional principles of statutory construction are given full 
force. The reason for this, however, is that ~has very 
~ little to do with giving states such author1ty. Rather, the 
source of such authority lies in other federal statutes, such as 
Public Law 280 (18 u.s.c. Sll62(a) and 28 u.s.c. Sl360(a)), which 
give states criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian country, 
see note 3 supra. Unfortunately, the parties entirely missed one 
another on this point in the proceedings below. The states seem 
to believe that Public Law 280 would provide the basis for such 
jurisdiction, but did not advance these arguments in the CA, see 
Petn App. at 41 n.l2, because they thought, and at least 
Washington appears still to think, that their enforcement powers 
under these laws are not involved in this case. Washington 
Amicus Brief at 16-17. CA9, on the other hand, believed that 
this question was the principal one in the case. It did not, 
- .L4 -
however, address whether Public Law 280 grants the states 
enforcement and prescription jurisdiction because it thought the 
states had abandoned these arguments, Petn App. at 41 n.l2. 
When Public Law 280 is considered I think a good case can be 
made- that the states covered by the statute (this includes 
..... ~____......___---
California) have been granted liquor licensing enforcement 
authority. Section 1360(a), 28 u.s.c., provides that specified 
-----._.,. 
states "shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action 
between Indians or to which Indians are parties ••• to the same 
extent that such State ••• has jurisdiction over other civil 
causes of action, and those civil laws of such State ••• that are 
of general application to private persons or private property 
shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country 
as they have elsewhere within the State •••• " Considering only 
the statutory language, it would be easy to conclude that "civil 
laws" includes liquor licensing laws and that "civil causes of 
action" includes enforcement actions under those laws. Bryan 
overcame this language, however, in refusing to conclude that the 
section gave states the power to impose property taxes on Indians 
on reservations. The reasoning of Bryan could well be extended 
to this case, although a fair distinction could be based on the 
fact that where liquor is involved Congress may have intended to 
give the States greater power than in other areas of civil 
regulation. Certainly Bryan's concern that permitting States to 
tax Indians would destroy existing tribal self-government is not 
implicated in this area, since Indians historically did not have 




Public Law 280 permits states to prescribe and enforce liquor 
licensing laws in Indian country therefore seems to be a 
substantial one. 
In summary, the issues involved are of considerable public 
L------> ....___ 
importance. The decision below is problematic in two respects. 
First, its resolution of what §1161 makes a federal crime is 
questionable, both procedurally and substantively. Although this 
would suggest a grant, the interlocutory nature of the 
proceedings and the fact that the CA's holding on this issue is 
not entirely clear cut against such action. I recommend CVSGing, 
to see whether the decision concerns the us. Second, CA9's 
treatment of the states' enforcement powers is more persuasive, -
but only because the states did not argue, and the CA did not 
need to address, statutes that are relevant to this question. 
Although cert was denied in United States v. New Mexico, 590 F.2d 
323 (1978) , where ~10 held that §1161 and other federal statutes 
did not give states enforcement power over their liquor licensing 
laws, that case did not involve a state given jurisdiction over 
Indian country by Public Law 280, see Petn App at 42 n.l7. Based 
on the Public Law even as interpreted i~ Bryan, I think there is 
a substantial question as to the correctness of the result 
reached below. Since the states did not rely on the statute 
below, however, it does not appear that they could do so here. 
(I think a fair reading of the petn, p. 10, is that it raises the 
question. The "Question Presented" do not, because of the 
rhetorical characterization of Sll61 by petr.) If ordinary 
principles requiring the raising of issues below are relaxed, 
( 
- 1.6 -
either because of the confusing procedural development of the 
case or the because the question of what §1161 means fairly 
subsumes issues relating to the meaning of other related federal 
statutes, I would recommend considering a grant. 
/ 
-- The 21st Amendment issue seems to depend on whether the ~ 
fed~-nl gove~e~has -2_u ':_i s~~_:_r ~ ~ ~~~stion, ~ 
which petr and Washington appear to concede. I recommend denying 
on this. (The papers do not indicate whether the AG was notified 
that the action below involved a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a federal statute.) 
There is a response and an amicus in support of the petn. 
October 18, 1982 Born Op. in Petn. 
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82-402 of Alcoholic California) 
v. Rehner 
This is a summary memo to file. Having taken a 
good preliminary look at the briefs, I will merely 
summarize my view of the better arguments on each side. 
Respondent, Eve Rehner, is a member of the Pala 
tribe and operates a store within the reservation. In a 
general sense, the question is whether she must obtain a 
state license to sell intoxicating beverages (liquor). 
The tribe (called the Pala Band) adopted an 
ordinance permitting the sale of intoxicating beverages. 
The ordinance was approved by the Secretary of the 
Interior, and therefore - according to the SG - she is 
"licensed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs". 
The Statute (18 u.s.c. 1161 
The SG (br. p. 1) describes §1161 as follows: 
"[It] exempts from an array of otherwise 
applicable federal criminal proscriptions [with 
respect to the sale of liquor in Indian country] 
any transaction 'in conformity both with the 
laws of the state in which it occurs and with an 
ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having 
jurisdiction over [the Indian country] certified 
by the Secretary of the Interior.'" 
The SG states the bottom line question as: 
"Whether this statute grants state government 
the power to require tribal Indians that intend 
to sell alcoholic beverages on trust lands 
within a reservation, pursuant to tribal 
authorization, to secure a state license." (br. 
p. 1) • 
.... 
The Court of Appeals (CA9) summarized §1161 as 
permitting "reservation sales of liquor by Indian tribes 
when such sales do not otherwise contravene state or 
tribal laws". (3A) 
~ 
The state of California's brief s-tate-s that 
§1161 requires that liquor traffic be "in conformity , bot_h 
with the laws of the state . . and an ordinance duly 
adopted by the tribe . " 
Both sides rely on the "plain language" of the 
statute. I agree with CA9 that, at least the correct 
interpretation of the statute is ambiguous. 
The state also relies upon its special power 
under the 21st Amendment. 
Petitioner's Argument 
Petitioner (the state) argues that the 
requirement that a liquor license be in conformity "both 
with the laws of the state . . and with tribal law (an 
J. 
ordinance duly adopted) , means what this language says. 
The term "laws" means all laws, including state law that 
requires a liquor license. It cites Maine v. Thiboutot 
where the Court construed the term in §1983 as meaning all 
laws - not just some subset of laws. 
Moreover~if §1161 is not construed to be an 
affirmative grant of state authority or jurisdiction to 
~~~//~[ 
license Indian liquor dealers, nGr goes the statute 
1\ 
prohibit the right to license. 
The state also relies strongly on the 21st 
Amendment, granting authority to the states to control 
liquor traffic. If there is a conflict between the 
Amendment and the right of Indians to govern themselves, 
the Amendment controls. 
The Court of Appeals purported to drawn a 
distinction between "substantive state law" and "state 
licensing" jurisdiction, but CA9 did not clearly describe 
what it meant by "substantive". The state argues that the ------distinction, however it is described is impractical and 
will create confusion. See p. 67 et seq. of its brief. 
Argument of the United States 
The SG's brief strongly supports affirmance, 
though it seems to do so primarily on policy grounds. It 
argues that §1161 "does not grant the state licensing 
jurisdiction over tribal Indians", and that the term 
"laws" as CA9 held refers to substantive as 
distinguished from licensing laws. 
The SG says that the United States "has 
consistently interpreted §1161 as not granting states 
regulatory licensing power over tribal Indians". He 
refers to an opinion of the Solicitor of the Interior 
Department in 1971, and to the position taken by the U.S. 
in the New Mexico case in which CAlO agreed with the 
government. U.S. v. New Mexico, 590 F. 2d 323. As would 
be expected, the SG relies heavily on the fact that 
respondent had been duly licensed by the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, and had acted pursuant to a duly enacted tribal 
ordinance. 
Policy considerations support CA9's decision: 
the operation of tourist attractions contribute to the 
economy of the tribes, and should not be hampered by state 





Respondent's brief makes many of the same 
arguments. 
* * * 
The case is a close one for me. I voted to 
deny, though I was puzzled by the distinction drawn by CA9 
between "substantive" and a state law that requires 
licensing. Despite the view of CA9 that the statute is 
ambiguous, the "plain language 
state. ~~~ 
~ s &-7-~/1-7. 
I have not mentioned 
seems to favor 
respect to the 21st Amendment. Probably the SG is right 
in saying that it applies only to the states, and does not 
inhibit federal regulation of Indian tribes. 
L • .F.P., Jr. 
ss 
82-401 Rice v. Rehner. As you know Indian law is 
almost as inscrutable to me as nuclear physics. I neverthe-
less am inclined to think that the SG is right in this case. 
He states that the only question presented is whether a 
state has authority to require a tribal Indian or a tribal 
entity to obtain a state liquor license for the privilege of 
operating a liquor store 
clined to think that 
authorizes or grants 
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Rice v. Rehner 
.From: Mark March 18, 1983 
Questions Presented 
1. Whether the Twenty-First Amendment authorizes the States 
to license the sale of liquor by tribal Indians on Indian reser--vat ions. 





The issue is the power of a State to regulate the sale of 
alcohol on Indian reservations. There are several federal statu-
e:; 
tory provisions imposing criminal penalties on persons introduc-
ing intoxicating liquors into "Indian country." See, e.g., 18 
U.S.C. §1156. But 18 U.S.C §1161 states that thes~ pro-- -
visions shall not apply --- ...... --
"to any act or transaction within any area of 
Indian country provided~h ac~r transac-
t ion i e in confQrm ~ ty oth wi t 6.tthe laws of 
the State i n- w~h sue act or transactions 
occurs and wit~n ordinance dul y adopted by 
the tr i behaving JUr i s (hct i on over SUCh area 
of Indian country ..•• " 
Resp is a member of the Pala Band of Mission Indians in San 
Diego County, California. She operates a general store on a res-
ervation, pursuant to a trading license issued by the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs. See 25 u.s.c. §261. The Pala Band has adopted 
an ordinance, approved by the Secretary of the Interior, Eermit-
ting sale of liquor on the reservation. She sought an exemption 
- ~ 
from the State of California's liquor licensing requirement. (A 
license costs $6,000, with a $350 annual fee. There are only a 
::5 hd.o.. 
limited number per county. Licenses are transferable, and resp 
.I\. -
alleges that the market price of a license is about $55,000.) 
Petr, head of the State Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 
told her she had to get a license. 
Resp brought suit in S.D. Cal. for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief. The DC dismissed the complaint. CA9, sitting en 
bane, reversed. (The court consolidated this case with one from 





not confer licensing jurisdiction on the States. The phrase 
"laws of the State" in the statute referred only to "state stand-
ards of conduct." (Pet. at 18-A.) Therefore, §1161 preempts 
state licensing jurisdiction. (Id., at 27-A.) Furthermore, the 
21st Amendment did not authorize such licensing. Accordingly, 
"so long as [resp] complies with the certified tribal ordinance 
.•• , she need not obtain a California license." (I d. , at 3 6 -A. ) 
Judge Goodwin dissented, arguing that the purpose of §1161 was 
only to permit Indians to be treated as other citizens, not to 
give them special rights. 
Following CA9' s decision, California amended its laws to 
permit licensed wholesalers to sell to nonlicensed retailers on 
Indian land. The law does not authorize retail sales by nonli-
censed Indians, and thus the case is not moot. 
This Court unfortunately granted cert. The United States 
has filed a brief supporting resp, as have five Indian Tribes. 
Various States have filed briefs supporting petr. 
II. Discussion 
The policy issue raised in this case is important: how to 
reconcile the States' broad authority to regulate the sale of 
liquor with the self-government of Indian Tribes. But the legal 
'-= 
issue in this case is narrow: may the States, as a matter of TZu. ~ 
state law, require traders on Indian reservations to obtain a 
state license to sell alcohol. I think it clear that no provi-
sion of law authorizes the States to impose this state-law re-
quirement on Indian Tribes. I recommend affirmance. cr-· 
4. 
A 
The analysis begins with a clear principle: "State 
generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian 
ervation except where Congress has expressly provided that State 
laws shall apply." McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm 1 n, 411 
u.s. 164, 170-171 (1973). For example, a State lacks authority 
to license the sale of cigarettes on reservations. Confederated 
Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 425 U.S 463 (1976). In the ab-
sence of some authorizing law, therefore, the States may not reg-
ulate liquor on reservations. 
B 
One possible source of authority is the 21st Amendment. 
Section 2 of that Amendment states: "The transportation or im-
portation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United 
States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in 
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." In my view 
the Amendment does not confer on the States any regulatory juris-
diction over Indian Tribes. The governing princi:p_le is that "the 
Amendment may have increased 1 the state 1 s power to deal with T ~ ---
[commerce in liquor] ••. , [but] it did not increase its · jurisdic-
tion. 1 " Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 u.s. 518, 538 
(1938). Thus, the grant of power under the 21st Amendment may be 
used with respect to Indian Tribes only if the States have an 
independent source of regulatory jurisdiction. 
c 
Petr 1 S central argument is that §1161 authorizes the States 
to impose their liquor regulations on Indian Tribes. He contends .. 
5. 
that the plain language of §1161 requires sales on reservations 
to he conducted "in conformity ... with the laws of the State," 
and this necessarily includes licensing laws. CA9 rejected this 
construction, holding that the phrase merely incorporated, as a 
matter of federal law, the State's substantive standards. 
I find this dispute over the meaning of this statutory 
phrase to be irrelevant in this case. The only issue is whether 
§1161 authorizes state regulation. It is clear to me that it 
does not. Section §1161 merely states that federal criminal pen-
alties will not be imposed where liquor sales on reservations 
conform to certain requirements. The provision says nothing 
about what a State may do as a matter of state law. It therefore 
hardly can be said to "authorize" state licensing of reservation 
liquor sales. Even if the phrase "laws of the States" does in-
clude licensing laws, the most §1161 would do is permit a federal 
criminal pros.ecut ion against an Indian who sells alcohol on a 
reservation without a state license. It would not provide any 
authority for a State to require, as a matter of state law, that 
the seller obtain a license. 
Once the case is viewed in this light, the policy arguments 
made in the case become irrelevant. For example, petr argues 
that while federal criminal penalties may be effective in enforc-
ing a flat ban on all liquor in Indian country, they would not 
work in enforcing comprehensive liquor regulations: criminal 
laws "operate too slowly and cannot adapt to the ever-changing 
market place," and they are "wholly inappropriate in many situa-
tions where violations are slight." (Pet. at 79.) This argument 
6. 
has merit, but as policy, not law. The fact that Congress may 
have chosen a poor means of implementing its legislative intent 
does not mean that this Court should rewrite the statute. 
Note that under my analysis CA9's opinion is troublesome in 
a couple of respects. 
------------~ ~ 
First, the court erred in finding that 
§1161 "preempted" state licensing. The proper analysis is that 
the~ates have no general authority to regulate liquor sales, 
and therefore that "preempt ion" is unnecessary. Rather, there 
-----..--~ ~-------~~----------- -ional authorization of state regulatory 
----------------~r-~-------------jurisdiction. 
/1 •\ 
of ~at §1161 actually means. The only holding necessary is that 
the State may not require, as a matter of state law, that resp 
'-" ~ -- ..- ----
obtain a 1 icense. This case does not present any issue as to --what standards resp must meet to avoid federal prosecution. 
D 
A final possible basis of authority for States to enforce 
their liquor regulations is P.L. 280. {Petr has not relied on ----this, but I discuss it briefly because it is mentioned in several 
briefs.) This law gives specified States {including California) 
jurisdiction to impose their general criminal and civil laws on 
reservation Indians. See 18 u.s.c. §262, 28 u.s.c. §1360. In 
Bryan v. Itasca County 426 u.s. 373 {1976), the Court held that 
§1360 did not "confer general state civil regulatory control over 
Indian reservations." Id., at 384. Under this holding, P.L. 280 
cannot be construed as giving States authority to impose their 
liquor licensing requirements on Indians. Perhaps, as the SG 
suggests, P.L. 280 may permit a State to enforce its substantive 
? 
7. 
liquor standards (e.g., a ban on sale of liquor to minors) either 
through state criminal prosecutions or as rules of decision in 
private civil actions. Brief for SG at 26. But the only ques-
tion here is whether the State can require resp to get a license. 
Nothing in P.L. 280 authorizes a State to do so. ~ ~
 
III. Conclusion 
I recommend affirmance on a narrow basis: (i) a State has -------
no general regulatory authority over Indian reservations; (ii) 
the 21st Amendment provides no such authority; and (iii) §1161 
provides no such authority, but merely concerns the standards for 
federal criminal prosecutions. 
The many policy issues raised and debated in the briefs are 
simply not presented here -- and it is to be hoped that they will 
never be presented here, but rather will be resolved through 
agreement between States and Tribes and/or through congressional 
legislation. 
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No. 82-401 Rice v. Rehner 
Dear Lewis, 
My basic view in this case is that although there is a 
canon of construction to the effect that a grant of 
jurisdiction to the State requires an explicit statement 
from Congress, it seems that this canon, like all canons of 
construction, is useful when we have no indication of 
congressional intent. In this case, I think that we do know 
what Congress intended, and the utility of the canon is 
diminished to that degree. 
The Senate Report on §1161 is useful in at least three 
respects. First, it indicates that the Senate Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs believed that §1161 empowered 
"a State or local municipality . • . to restrict the sales 
of intoxicants to Indians." S. Rep. 722, 83rd Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1953). Second, the Report indicates that §1161 
started off as a measure applicable only to Arizona. The 
Senate Committee recommended that the statute have general 
application. Arizona was not one of the States covered by 
the simultaneously enacted PL 280. Therefore, if, as the 
Senate Report indicates, Congress intended to empower States 
to "restrict" sales if they so decided, then it had to be 
the case that they intended this to be done through §1161 
because very few states had, and have, power under PL 280. 
Third, the Senate Report indicates that the purpose of §1161 
was to remove discrimination against Indians. If we 
interpret §1161 in the way that the respondent suggests, 
then the effect will be not only to remove discrimination, 
but also to provide a clear preference for Indians by 
exempting them from requirements imposed on all others in 
the State. In addition, the effect of a decision adverse to 
the petitioner would be particularly troubling in those 
States that have monopoly control over liquor. For example, 
Washington has made contraband all liquor not purchased 
through its monopoly scheme. If Indians alone can buy and 
import at market prices any liquor that they desire, then 
Indians are given a considerable advantage that I doubt 
Congress intended to provide to them in light of the desire 
merely to remove discrimination. 
.. 
2. 
In addition to the Senate Report, the interpretation 
given to §1161 from 1953 to 1971 by the Department of the 
Interior was consistent with the petitioner's view. During 
congressional hearings on §1161, then-Commissioner of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs Dillon Myer was asked whether the 
statute should include a statement that §1161 did not affect 
any state laws. In response, Commissioner Myer explained 
that "[w] e certainly do not intend to try to revise State 
laws regarding Indians or anyone else, and it should be 
clear that is provided. [The statute does not] 
interfere with State laws." Brief for Petr, Vol. I I, at A-
26, A-27. 
A 1954 Opinion of the Solicitor of the Interior 
indicated clearly that the Solicitor thought that States 
were able to impose their licensing requirements. The 
Opinion was issued in response to the views of the Attorney 
General of California, and the Solicitor opined that the 
State may "license sales of liquor on such reservation for 
consumption both on and off the premises where the liquor is 
sold." A copy of the opinion is enclosed. The 1958 Federal 
Indian Handbook, published by the Government and approved by 
the Secretary of the Interior, relied on this 1954 Opinion 
and stated that "a State license to sell for consumption on 
the premises will give protection only against State 
prosecutions but not against Federal prosecutions under 
section 1156." Id., at 383 (emphasis added) • The 
implication here is that the Secretary of the Interior was 
of the view that the States could enforce their licensing 
requirements. It is ironic that the SG relies on a quote 
from another portion of this same 1958 edition of the 
Handbook to establish and support the proposition that a 
grant of jurisdiction to the States must be explicit. See 
Brief for the SG, at 8. It appears to me that what was 
required in 1958 to satisfy the requirement of an explicit 
grant of state jurisdiction was somewhat less than what this 
Court has required more recently.Although a 1971 Opinion of 
the Solicitor of the Interior indicated that the States 
could not impose their licensing requirements, I feel that 
the early practice is surely relevant to a determination of 
what Congress intended, especially when the Secretary 
espoused this view in congressional hearings before the 









It seems to me a creditable op1n1on could be written for 













' I so much appreciate your taldnq the time - busy 
as we all are .;;.. to outline how you thought a reversal of CA9 
could be written. 
' ' 
There is no doubt in my min~ as to the s~nsibl~ 
resolut'on of this case. It makes little sense to have li-
quor stores operating in a state purquant to different and 
probably conflicting regulations. Yet, I qtill find it ~if­
ficult to conclude that §1161 actually qrantP~ authortty tn 
the states to enforce their requlations. tt may he that 
~1161 fairly can be read to make it a federal crime to sell"' 
liquor on a reservation without a state license. Such a 
reading would not confer ;my indeoendent authoritv on the " 
state. itt'' ~};;,.:· ~.\.'f1;."'. '<'fj' 'fi r~:,r ~"! ·,:!li·"' ,;"f, 'f,i!f ,.:t C:J·.' 
(; 0'.~ :'t:t: ' t'; ~ ./!.• t ,.,~~ '":,..,: ';\; :.:~ .. -, "~- .t;, t''iy-. • ... ~~., 
, f~··.:~l:Pav i ng said a 1l of this, r 
res~; ~ ~nd .will await the writing. 
~- "-"_¥; ~ ... -.i~ '-~ t h' k; •.• • 
·" ,~,~~· " d~:~1~ f~~nk you. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.:§np:rtntt <!fcn:rt of tlrt ~b' .:§taftg 
'~Jbwqmgfun. ~- <!J. 20giJ!~ 
April 2, 1983 
Re: RICE v. REHNER 
~82-401 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
At Conference I voted to affirm in this close case, 
but my further consideration leads me to make my vote 
to reverse. Dividing the regulation of liquor ·dispensing 
between a State and the Indians, even with the Secretary 
of Interior as a "monitor" does not "wash." 
My vote is to reverse. 
Regards, 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE w .. . ..J . BRENNAN, ..JR. 
j;ttp"ttntt <qcttrl cf flrt 'J!fui:ttb jtaU$ 
Jfa,glfi:ngtcn. ~. <q. 20~~~ ' 
April 4, 1983 
Re: No. 82-401 -- Rice v. Rehner 
Dear Thurgood, Harry and Lewis, 
We four are in dissent in the 
above. Lewis, will you take on the 
dissent? 
Sincerely, 
) . . ,








As ! think vour not:~s •-11i 11 show, my vote in this '·' " 
case was tentatlve. I have no doubt as to the desirability 
of a unifoyrn system of statewide regulation of liquor 
stores. I therefore heve gaid to Sandra, who feels verv . 
Strongly at"lout. thic:!. Ca,!=:f' 1 that. ! '•10Uld try t.O be open minded &, 
about what she writes for the Court. ' f· • 
\,,, ! ·.~· 
'i, '•1. _ .... ,,, 
~ut T hetve not v~t foun~ it ~">asv to r ad the st.At-
utorv fr.am~=>worl< as vestina ;n the states ,t .he i'\nthoritv .tp · 
license and requl;:~te the.se storec;. ~--·" ·-:· "- .... t" 
f .~ 1, .',i.·~b f _.'tO ~>· •. ~ <,. . . f,',~~ .• ~~~·.:~ ;'\:! 
I It:;."'(; . ~ .. .. __ , '"~ : · :rn these' ci rcum~tances, ' ' f yo'u "1i sh mE> to do so 
\-dll be happv t .o trv my hand at a memorani!um of dissent • . I 
Sandra should persuade me, my mP.mC'Irandum, of course, would ' 
0 
be available to you, . Thurqoo~ and HPrry. 
tt,:~· J ' ' 
"''"'-'I· -. ~ . . ~ 
· "'}'J. T al1\ a bit "st-acked up" at the moment-·~ but if the ~ 
preoaratfon of a memorandum is satisfactory, I ·~il.J qladly 






MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Mark 
Re: Rice v. Rehn~, No. 82-401 
I have reviewed Justice 0' Connor's draft opinion in this 
case. I also have talked about it with Jim (with respect to con-
sistency with Justice Marshall's Mescalero opinion) and clerks in 
other chambers. My view is that I am now genuinely uncertain as 
to the proper outcome of the case. If we had not been assigned 
the dissent, I would simply propose awaiting it. In view of your 
strong inclination to the disposition reached by SOC, however, I 
think you should join. 
The basic discussion of "Indian law" in the beginning gener-
ally tracks the discussion in Mescalero. (I understand the two 
chambers attempted to coordinate this.) There is some tension at 
points, but nothing major. There are two trends in the law any-
way -- (i) deference to tribal sovereignty (and thus an assump-
tion that state laws do not apply absent clear congressional in-
tent), and (ii) search for congressional preemption (and thus an 
assumption that state laws do apply unless there is preemption) -
- and these opinions do not substantially change this. 
SOC decides that in view of the history of total federal 
control over liquor on reservations, there is no inherent tribal 
sovereignty interest in liquor regulation. I am not yet con-
vinced this is correct -- it seems that an argument can be made 
that this is an unduly restrictive view of tribal sovereignty --
'· 
I' • ,. 
2. 
but the history of liquor regulation certpinly is unique. 
Thus, at bottom this remains a fact-bound case involving the 
unusual situation of liquor licensing. And I think SOC has done 
as good a job as possible in finding support in the legislative 
history for the view that Congress really intended that §1161 
permit States to apply their licensing laws to Indian reserva-
tions. There also are two contemporaneous DOI opinions that as-
sume this answer. Finally, she provides a plausible (though not 
entirely convincing} explanation of why §1161 may be read as more 
than just an exception to federal criminal liability: she points 
out that the same section was read in Mazur ie, 419 U.S. 544 
(1974}, as delegating liquor authority to Tribes. SOC asks, 
fairly, why if §1161 delegates authority to Tribes it may not 
also delegate authority to States. 
A dissent would have to rely heavily on the canon of con-
struction that we assume that state laws do not apply to tribal 
Indians unless Congress expressly so provides. To argue this, we 
would have to challenge SOC's basic reading of Indian law. A 
reasonable argument can still be made on this point, but I am not 
sure it is more persuasive than the other side. 
Given that there is a reasonable argument for SOC's opinion, 
I see no reason for you to dissent. Her basic point is that it 
is hard to believe that Congress really intended to prohibit 
state liquor licensing on reservations -- and that is your view. 
:;~~ 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL~~ men 05/27/83 
From: Mark 
Re: _R_ic_e_ v. R~hner, 82-401 --Draft Letter to WJB (cc: TM, HAB) 
I have reviewed Sandra's opinion in this case, and I am in-
clined to join. 
As you will recall, my vote to affirm always has been tenta-
tive. I found it difficult to believe that Congress in 1954 in-
tended to prevent the States from regulating liquor sales on In-
dian reservations. But because of the peculiar nature of the 
statute in this case -- seeming to create only an exception to 
federal criminal liability -- I had difficulty finding the source 
of state authority. 
After reading Sandra's draft, however, I am persuaded to 
join in voting to reverse. The history that she details is con-
vincing that Indian Tribes never have possessed inherent author-
ity over liquor sales and that in 1954 the Congress believed that 
such sales on reservations would be subject to the same state 
laws as all liquor sales. 
I apologize for "jumping ship" after having been assigned 
the dissent. 
<_ ' 
;§n:pr.enu Qf01trlllf tlr.t~mu~ ,®tattg 
:Jfan-lfhtghm. ~. Qf. 20&T'!.1 
CHAMBE RS Of' 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
May 27, 1983 
Re: 82-401 - Rice v. Rehner 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice O'Connor 









~u.prtmt <qamt of tltt ~tb ~hdtg 
~as!ytngton. ~. <!f. 21lc?J.I.~ 
CHAM BER S OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . R E HNQUIST 
May 27, 1983 
Re: No. 82-401 Rice v. Rehner 
Dear Sandra: 








Dear ~· .. 
~\{: :· ~ 
,r 
'\ 
, ~N1r,, "' '!\. ~·· 
:::, !11.' my , letter>'• to you 5 , responding to your '' 
inquiry whether I would draft a dissent for t he four of us 
who voted that way, I recorned my ,cloubt as to th.e · proper :·,:· 
disposition ~f th~s cas • · 
'· .. 't·J,:'';~ 
;;<• 
'·"'t, 
b Sandra's opinion , circulated ~1ay 26, is per sua-.,",,,, 
sive . She details history that is rather convincing that 
Indian· Tribes never possessed inherent authority over liquor 
sales, and that in 1954 Congress believed that such sales on 
reser~ations would be subject to the same stat~ laws as all ~ 
liquor sales." This makes a go0d rleal,of sense to ,me . In a r· 
word , 1 think,. I could ·join SandrE\ . ',;:.', ·~ .. :.·;:··' i ,,: 
~ ,;~";.').• ~ L• "') ;<: .; ~). \1: ~~) 
r,"',,::. Neverthel~ss, I recognize t't!~'t the question is 
close, and I volunteeren in my letter of Apd, 1 5 to prepare 
a memorandum advancing a. different view . If you, rrhuraood 
and Harry a~e still of ' a mind to ~issent ~· and wish me . to do 
so - ,I ;.wiJ) ! be lad · to pndertake the 'memor:andu'!' · 
' '!<l:i 'k: .. ~:J,; ji ·.:t~·· t .~ 1 






.iu;rttutt <!fcurl cf f!rt ~b .ita±t.s 
:.uJri:tt\lht~ ~. <!f. 2ll&f~~ 
C HAMBE;RS OF" 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
May 31, 1983 
No. 82-401 
Rice v . Rehner 
Dear Lewis, 
It's very good of you to undertake 
the memorandum in dissent. However, I 
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..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE June 1, 1983 
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.§u:pumt Qfcurl ttf tlft ~b .§taftg 
'Jfagqmghtn.. ~. <q. 2.0.;T't~ 
June 3, 1983 




Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.:§uprtmt <ijourl of tqt ~tlt .;§twa 
11Ias Jringhm. !9. <ij. 21l~J!~ 
June 28, 1983 ~ 
Re: No. 82-401-Rice v. Rehner 
Dear Harry: 





cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.§u:prtmt <!Jourl of tfrt 'J!htittb .§tidt.s' 
Ji'MJri:ngt~ ~. <!J. 2.0bTJ!.~ 
June 29, 1983 
No. 82-401 
Rice v. Rehner 
Dear Harry, 
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SOC for the Court 
1st draft 5/26/83 
2nd draft 6/30/83 
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HAB dissent 
Typed draft 6/27/83 
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Joined by WJB, TM 
